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Abstract
We study dynamic changes of agents’ observational power in logics of knowledge and time. We
consider CTL∗K, the extension of CTL∗ with knowledge operators, and enrich it with a new
operator that models a change in an agent’s way of observing the system. We extend the classic
semantics of knowledge for perfect-recall agents to account for changes of observation, and we
show that this new operator strictly increases the expressivity of CTL∗K. We reduce the model-
checking problem for our logic to that for CTL∗K, which is known to be decidable. This provides
a solution to the model-checking problem for our logic, but its complexity is not optimal. Indeed
we provide a direct decision procedure with better complexity.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Logic and Verification
Keywords and phrases Epistemic logic, Temporal logic, Model checking
1 Introduction
In multi-agent systems, agents usually have only partial information about the state of
the system [23]. This has led to the development of epistemic logics, often combined with
temporal logics, for describing and reasoning about how distributed systems and agents’
knowledge evolve over time. Such formalisms have been applied to the modelling and analysis
of, e.g., distributed protocols [18, 12], information flow and cryptographic protocols [26, 13]
and knowledge-based programs [27].
In these frameworks, an agent’s view of a particular state of the system is given by
an observation of that state. In all the cited settings, an agent’s observation of a given
state does not change over time. In other words, these frameworks have no primitive for
reasoning about agents whose observation power can change. Because this phenomenon
occurs in real scenarios, for instance when a user of a system is granted access to previously
hidden data, we propose here to tackle this problem. Precisely, we extend classic epistemic
1 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 709188.
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23:2 Changing Observations in Epistemic Temporal Logic
temporal logics with a new unary operator, ∆o, that represents changes of observation
power, and is read “the agent changes her observation power to o”. For instance, the formula
∆o1AF(∆o2(Kp ∨K¬p)) expresses that “For an agent with initial observation power o1, in
all possible futures there exists a point where, if the agent updates her observation power to
o2, she learns whether or not the proposition p holds”. If in this example o1 and o2 represent
different “security levels” and p is sensitive information, then the formula expresses a possible
avenue for attack. The logics and model-checking procedures that we present in this paper
allow the expression and evaluation of such properties. Another motivation for studying such
logics comes from the recently introduced Strategy Logic with Imperfect Information [6], an
extension of Strategy Logic [19] in which agents can dynamically change observation power
when changing strategies.
There is a rich history of epistemic logic in AI, including the static and temporal
settings [12], the dynamic setting [28] as well as the strategic setting [23]. The most common
logics of knowledge and time are CTLK, LTLK and CTL∗K, which extend the classic temporal
logics CTL, LTL and CTL∗ with epistemic operators. These logics have been studied for two
main recall abilities: no memory or perfect recall. For memoryless agents, adapting the
semantics of these logics to include the observation-change operator is straightforward. Model-
checking algorithms also can be easily adapted by keeping updated in the procedure each
agent’s current observation, and this information is of linear size. The resulting logics thus
have a Pspace-complete model-checking problem, as LTLK, CTLK and CTL∗K do [21, 16].
The case of agents with perfect recall, which we study in this work, is more delicate. The
model-checking problem for LTLK and CTL∗K is nonelementary decidable [25, 8, 1], with
k-Exptime upper-bound for formulas with at most k nested knowledge operators. The same
upper-bounds are known for CTLK [10]. In this work we show that, as for the memoryless
semantics, the introduction of observation changes in epistemic temporal logics with perfect
recall does not increase the complexity of the model-checking problem.
We extend CTL∗K (which subsumes CTLK and LTLK) with observation-change operators
∆o, starting with the single-agent case, and we solve its model-checking problem. To do
so we define an alternative semantics which, unlike the natural one, is based on a bounded
amount of information. Once the two semantics proven to be equivalent, designing a model-
checking algorithm is almost straightforward. We then extend the logic to the multi-agent
case, introducing operators ∆oa for each agent a, and we extend our approach to solve its
model-checking problem. Next, we study the expressivity of our logic, showing that the
observation-change operator increases expressivity. We finally provide a reduction to CTL∗K
which shows how to remove observation-change operators, at the cost of a blow-up in the
size of the model. Our direct model-checking procedure is shown to have a better complexity
than going through this reduction and using known model-checking algorithms for CTL∗K.
2 CTL∗K∆
In this section we define the logic CTL∗K∆, which extends CTL∗K. We first study the case
where there is only one agent (and thus only one knowledge operator). We will extend to the
multi-agent setting in Section 5.
2.1 Notation
A finite (resp. infinite) word over some alphabet Σ is an element of Σ∗ (resp. Σω). The
length of a finite word w = w0 . . . wn is |w| = n+ 1, and we let last(w) = wn. Given a finite
(resp. infinite) word w and 0 ≤ i ≤ |w| (resp. i ∈ N), we let wi be the letter at position i in
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w, w≤i is the prefix of w that ends at position i, and w≥i is the suffix that starts at position
i. We write w 4 w′ if w is a prefix of w′.
2.2 Syntax
We fix a countably infinite set of atomic propositions, AP. We also let O be a finite set of
observations, that represent possible observational powers of the agent. Note that in this
work, “observation” does not refer to a punctual observation of a system’s state, but rather
a way of observing the system, or “observational power” of an agent.
As for state and path formulas in CTL∗, we distinguish between history formulas and path
formulas. We say history formulas instead of state formulas because, considering agents with
perfect recall of the past, the truth of epistemic formulas depends not only on the current
state, but also on the history before reaching this state.
I Definition 1 (Syntax). The sets of history formulas ϕ and path formulas ψ are defined by
the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Aψ | Kϕ | ∆oϕ
ψ ::= ϕ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | Xψ | ψUψ,
where p ∈ AP and o ∈ O.
We call CTL∗K∆ formulas all history formulas so defined. Operators X and U are the
classic next and until operators of temporal logics, and A is the universal path quantifier
from branching-time temporal logics. K is the knowledge operator from epistemic logics, and
Kϕ reads as “the agent knows that ϕ is true”. Our new observation change operator, ∆o,
reads as “the agent now observes the system with observation o”.
As usual, we define > = p ∨ ¬p, ϕ ∨ ϕ′ = ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), ϕ→ ϕ′ = ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ′, as well as the
temporal operators finally (F) and always (G): Fϕ = >Uϕ, and Gϕ = ¬F¬ϕ.
2.3 Semantics
The models of CTL∗K∆ are Kripke structures equipped with one observation relation ∼o on
states for each observation o.
I Definition 2 (Models). A Kripke structure with observations is given as a structure
M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι, oι), where
AP ⊂ AP is a finite subset of atomic propositions,
S is a set of states,
T ⊆ S × S is a left-total2 transition relation,
V : S → 2AP is a valuation function,
∼o⊆ S × S is an equivalence relation, for each o ∈ O,
sι ⊆ S is an initial state, and
oι ∈ O is the initial observation.
A path is an infinite sequence of states pi = s0s1 . . . such that for all i ≥ 0, siTsi+1, and
a history h is a finite prefix of a path. For I ⊆ S, we write T (I) = {s′ | ∃s ∈ I s.t. sTs′} for
the set of successors of states in I. Finally, for o ∈ O and s ∈ S, we let [s]o = {s′ | s ∼o s′}
be the equivalence class of s for relation ∼o.
2 i.e., for every s ∈ S there exists s′ ∈ S such that sTs′. This cosmetic restriction is made to avoid having
to deal with finite runs ending in deadlocks.
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I Remark. We model agents’ information via indistinguishability relations ∼o, where s ∼o s′
means that s and s′ are indistinguishable for an agent who has observation power o. Other
approaches exist. One is via observation functions (see, e.g., [25]), that map states to atomic
observations, and where two states are indistinguishable for an observation function if they
have the same image. Another consists in seeing states as tuples of local states, one for each
agent, two global states being indistinguishable for an agent if her local state is the same in
both (see, e.g., [16]). All these formalisms are essentially equivalent with respect to epistemic
temporal logics [20]. In these alternative formalisms, observation change would correspond
to, respectively, changing observation function, and changing local states in global states.
Note that the formalism via local states, because indistinguishability is hard-coded in states
of the system, is less adapted to the modelling of observation change.
Observation records. To define which histories the agent cannot distinguish, we need to
keep track of how she observed the system at each point in time. To do so, we record each
observation change as a pair (o, n), where o is the new observation and n is the time when
this change occurs.
I Definition 3. An observation record is a finite word over O × N.
Note that observation records are meant to represent changes of observational ability,
and thus they do not contain the initial observation (which is given in the model). We write
∅ for the empty observation record.
I Example 4. Consider a model M with initial observation oι, a history h = s0 . . . s4 and
an observation record r = (o1, 0) · (o2, 3) · (o3, 3). The agent first observes state s0 with
observation oι. The observation record shows that at time 0, thus before the first transition,
the agent changed for observation o1. She then observed state s0 again, but this time with
observation o1. Then the system goes through states s1 and s2 and reaches s3, all of which
she observes with observation o1. At time 3, the agent changes to observation o2, and
thus observes state s3 again, but this time with observation o2, and finally she switches to
observation o3 and thus observes s3 once more, with observation o3. Finally, the system goes
to state s4, which the agent observes with observation o3.
We write r·(o, n) for the observation record obtained by appending (o, n) to the observation
record r, and r[n] for the record consisting of all pairs (o,m) in r such that m = n. We say
that an observation record r stops at n if r[m] is empty for all m > n, and r stops at history
h if it stops at |h| − 1. Unless otherwise specified, when we consider an observation record r
together with a history h, it is understood that r stops at h.
Observations at time n. We let ol(r, n) be the list of observations used by the agent at
time n. It consists of the observation that the agent has when the n-th transition is taken,
plus those of observation changes that occur before the next transition. It is defined by
induction on n:
ol(r, 0) = oι · o1 · . . . · ok,
if r[0] = (o1, 0) · . . . · (ok, 0), and
ol(r, n+ 1) = last(ol(r, n)) · o1 · . . . · ok,
if r[n+ 1] = (o1, n+ 1) · . . . · (ok, n+ 1).
Observe that ol(r, n) is never empty: if no observation change occurs at time n, ol(r, n)
only contains the last observation taken by the agent. If r is empty, the latter is the initial
observation oι defined by the model.
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I Example 5. Consider record r = (o1, 0) · (o2, 3) · (o3, 3). We have that ol(r, 0) = oι · o1,
ol(r, 1) = ol(r, 2) = o1, ol(r, 3) = o1 · o2 · o3, and ol(r, 4) = o3.
Synchronous perfect recall. The usual definition of synchronous perfect recall states that
for an agent with observation o, histories h and h′ are indistinguishable if they have the same
length and are point-wise indistinguishable, i.e., |h| = |h′| and for each i < |h|, hi ∼o h′i.
We adapt this definition to changing observations: two histories are indistinguishable if,
at each point in time, the states are indistinguishable for all observations used at that time.
I Definition 6 (Dynamic synchronous perfect recall). Given an observation record r, two
histories h and h′ are equivalent, written h ≈r h′, if
|h| = |h′| and ∀i < |h|, ∀o ∈ ol(r, i), hi ∼o h′i.
We now define the natural semantics of CTL∗K∆.
I Definition 7 (Natural semantics). Fix a model M . A history formula ϕ is evaluated in a
history h and an observation record r. A path formula ψ is interpreted on a run pi, a point
in time n ∈ N and an observation record. The semantics is defined by induction on formulas:
h, r |= p if p ∈ V (last(h))
h, r |= ¬ϕ if h, r 6|= ϕ
h, r |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if h, r |= ϕ1 and h, r |= ϕ2
h, r |= Aψ if ∀pi s.t. h 4 pi, pi, |h| − 1, r |= ψ
h, r |= Kϕ if ∀h′ s.t. h′ ≈r h, h′, r |= ϕ
h, r |= ∆oϕ if h, r · (o, |h| − 1) |= ϕ
pi, n, r |= ϕ if pi≤n, r |= ϕ
pi, n, r |= ¬ψ if pi, n, r 6|= ψ
pi, n, r |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 if pi, n, r |= ψ1 and pi, n, r |= ψ2
pi, n, r |= Xψ if pi, (n+ 1), r |= ψ
pi, n, r |= ψ1Uψ2 if ∃m ≥ n s.t. pi,m, r |= ψ2 and
∀k s.t. n ≤ k < m, pi, k, r |= ψ1
We say that a model M with initial state sι satisfies a CTL∗K∆ formula ϕ, written M |= ϕ,
if sι, ∅ |= ϕ.
We first discuss a subtlety of our semantics, which is that an agent can observe the same
state consecutively with several observations.
I Remark. Consider the formula ∆o′ϕ and history h. By definition, h, r |= ∆o′ϕ iff h, r ·
(o′, |h| − 1) |= ϕ. Note that although the history did not change (it is still h), the observation
record is extended by the observation o′ at time |h| − 1, with the following consequence.
Suppose that ol(r, |h|−1) = o. After switching to o′, the agent considers possible all histories
h′ such that i) h ∼r h′ (they were considered possible before the change of observation) and
ii) last(h) ∼o′ last(h′) (they are still considered possible after the change of observation).
Informally this means that by changing observation from o to o′, the agent’s information
is further refined by o′, and it is as though the agent at time |h| − 1 observed the system
with observation o ∩ o′. At later times, her observation is simply o′, until another change of
observation occurs.
2.4 Examples of observation change
I Example 8. A logic of accumulative knowledge (and resource bounds) is introduced in [15].
It studies agents that can perform successive observations to improve their knowledge of
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¬p
s2
¬p
s1
¬p
s3
¬p
s5
p
s4
¬p
s6
¬p∼o1
∼o1 ∼o2
∼o2,o1
Figure 1 Model M in the security example
the situation, each observation refining their current view of the world. In their framework,
an observation models a yes/no question about the current situation; if the answer is ‘yes’,
the agent can eliminate all possible worlds for which the answer is ‘no’, and vice versa.
Formally, an observation is a binary partition of the possible states, and the agent learns in
which partition is the current state. Such observations are particular cases of our models’
indistinguishability relations, and the semantics of an agent performing an observation o is
exactly captured by the semantics of our operator ∆o. Similarly, performing sequence of
observations o1 . . . on corresponds to the successive application of operators ∆o1 . . .∆on . As
an example, [15] shows how to model a medical diagnosis in which the disease is narrowed
down by performing a series of successive tests.
Our logic is incomparable with the one discussed in the previous example, in which
observations have a cost, but no temporal aspect is considered. In this work we do not
consider costs, but we study the evolution of knowledge through time in addition to dynamic
observation change. We now illustrate with an example how both interact.
I Example 9 (Security scenario). Consider a system with two possible levels of security clear-
ance, which define what information users have access to, and are modelled by observations
o1 and o2. In this scenario, we want to hide a secret p from the users. A desirable property is
thus expressed by the formula (∆o1AG¬Kp) ∧ (∆o2AG¬Kp), which means that a user using
either o1 or o2 will never know that p holds. Model M from Figure 1 satisfies this formula.
Now consider the formula ϕ = ∆o1EF∆o2Kp, which means that if the user starts with
observation o1, there exists a moment where she might discover the secret by changing her
observation. We show that M satisfies ϕ and thus that it should forbid users to change
their security level. Consider the history h = s0s2s5 in model M with initial observation
o1. At time 0 the user knows that the system is in state s0. After going to s2, she does
not know if the current state is s2 or s1, as they are indistinguishable using o1. At time 2,
at first the user does not know whether the system is in s4 or s5. Even though s6 and s5
are indistinguishable with o1, she does not consider s6 possible, as she remembers that the
system was not in s3 before. Now, if she changes to observation o2, she sees that the system
is either in state s5 or s6. Refining her previous knowledge that the system is either in state
s4 or s5, she deduces that the current state is s5, and that p holds.
I Example 10 (Fault-Tolerant Diagnosability). Diagnosability is a property of systems in
which the occurrence of a failure is always eventually detected [22]. In the setting considered
in [7], a diagnosability condition is a pair (c1, c2) of nonempty disjoint sets of states that the
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system should always be able to tell apart. The system is monitored through a set of sensors,
and they study the problem of finding minimal sets of sensors that ensure diagnosability.
That is, find a minimal sensor configuration sc such that ∆oscAG(Kc1 ∨Kc2) holds, where
osc is the observation corresponding to sensor configuration sc.
In CTL∗K∆ one can express and model-check a stronger notion of diagnosability that we
call fault-tolerant diagnosability, where the system must remain diagnosable even after the
loss of a sensor. For a given diagnosability condition (c1, c2) and sensor configuration sc, we
write osc the original observation (with every sensor in sc), oi the observation where sensor
i failed, and pi is a proposition indicating the failure of sensor i. The following formula
expresses that sensor configuration sc ensures fault-tolerant diagnosability of the system:
Φdiag = ∆oscAG((Kc1 ∨Kc2) ∧ (pi → ∆oiAG(Kc1 ∨Kc2))).
Observe that it is possible for a system to satisfy Φdiag but not ∆oiAG(Kc1 ∨ Kc2) if
sensor i, before failing, brings some piece of information that is crucial for diagnosis.
2.5 Model-checking problem
We are interested in the model checking-problem for CTL∗K∆ which consists in, given a
model M and a formula ϕ, deciding whether M |= ϕ.
Model-checking approach. Perfect-recall semantics refers to histories of unbounded
length, but it is well known that in many situations it is possible to maintain a bounded
amount of information that is sufficient to deal with perfect recall. We show that it is also
the case for our logic, by generalising the classic approach to take into account observation
change. Intuitively, it is enough to know the current state, the current observation and the
set of states that the agent believes the system might be in. The latter is usually called
information set in epistemic temporal logics and games with imperfect information. We
define an alternative semantics based on information sets instead of histories and records,
and we prove that this semantics is equivalent to the natural one presented in this section.
Because information sets are of bounded size, it is then easy to build from this alternative
semantics a model checking algorithm for CTL∗K∆.
3 Alternative semantics
We define an alternative semantics for CTL∗K∆. It is based on information sets, a classic
notion in games with imperfect information [29], whose definition we now adapt to our
setting.
I Definition 11 (Information sets). Given a model M , the information set I(h, r) after a
history h and an observation record r is defined as follows:
I(h, r) = {s ∈ S | ∃h′, h′ ≈r h and last(h′) = s}.
This information is sufficient to evaluate epistemic formulas for one agent when we consider
the S5 semantics of knowledge, i.e., when indistinguishability relations are equivalence
relations as is the case here. We now describe how this information can be maintained along
the evaluation of a formula. To do so, we define two update functions for information sets.
One is used when the agent changes of observational power, and the other when a transition
is taken in the model.
23:8 Changing Observations in Epistemic Temporal Logic
I Definition 12 (Information set updates). Fix a model M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι, oι).
Functions UT and U∆ are defined as follows, for all I ⊆ S, all s, s′ ∈ S and o, o′ ∈ O.
UT (I, s′, o) = T (I) ∩ [s′]o
U∆(I, s, o′) = I ∩ [s]o′
These updates read as follows. When the agent has observational power o and information
set I, and the model takes a transition to a state s′, the new information set is UT (I, s′, o),
which consists of all successors of her previous information set I that are ∼o-indistinguishable
with the new state s′. When the agent is in state s with information set I, and she changes
for observational power o′, her new information set is U∆(I, s, o′), i.e., all states that she
considered possible before and that she still considers possible after switching to o′.
We let O(h, r) be the last observation taken by the agent after history h, according to r.
Formally, O(h, r) = on if ol(r, |h| − 1) = o1 · . . . · on. The following result establishes that the
functions U∆ and UT correctly update information sets. It is proved by simple application of
the definitions.
I Proposition 13. For every history h · s, every observation record r that stops at h, and
every observation o, it holds that
I(h · s, r) = UT (I(h, r), s, O(h, r)), and
I(h, r · (o, |h| − 1)) = U∆(I(h, r), last(h), o).
Using these update functions we can now define our alternative semantics for CTL∗K∆.
I Definition 14 (Alternative semantics). Fix a model M . A history formula ϕ is evaluated
in a state s, an information set I and an observation o. A path formula ψ is interpreted on a
run pi, an information set I and an observation o. The semantic relation |=I is defined by
induction on formulas:
s, I, o |=I p if p ∈ V (s)
s, I, o |=I ¬ϕ if s, I, o 6|=I ϕ
s, I, o |=I ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if s, I, o |=I ϕ1 and s, I, o |=I ϕ2
s, I, o |=I Aψ if ∀pi s.t. pi0 = s, pi, I, o |=I ψ
s, I, o |=I Kϕ if ∀s′ ∈ I, s′, I, o |=I ϕ
s, I, o |=I ∆o′ϕ if s, U∆(I, s, o′), o′ |=I ϕ
pi, I, o |=I ϕ if pi0, I, o |=I ϕ
pi, I, o |=I ¬ψ if pi, I, o 6|=I ψ
pi, I, o |=I ψ1 ∧ ψ2 if pi, I, o |=I ψ1 and pi, I, o |=I ψ2
pi, I, o |=I Xψ if pi≥1, UT (I, pi1, o), o |=I ψ
pi, I, o |=I ψ1Uψ2 if ∃n ≥ 0 such that pi≥n, UnT (I, pi, o), o |=I ψ2 and
∀m such that 0 ≤ m < n, pi≥m, UmT (I, pi, o), o |=I ψ1,
where UnT (I, pi, o) is the iteration of the temporal update, defined inductively as follows:
U0T (I, pi, o) = I, and
Un+1T (I, pi, o) = UT (UnT (I, pi, o), pin+1, o).
Using Proposition 13, one can prove that the natural semantics |= and the information
semantics |=I are equivalent (the proof is in Appendix A).
I Theorem 15. For every history formula ϕ, model M , history h and observation record r
that stops at h,
h, r |= ϕ iff last(h), I(h, r), o(h, r) |=I ϕ.
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4 Model checking CTL∗K∆
In this section we devise a model-checking procedure based on the equivalence between the
natural and alternative semantics (Theorem 15), and we prove the following result.
I Theorem 16. Model checking CTL∗K∆ is in Exptime.
Augmented model. Given a model M , we define an augmented model Mˆ in which the
states are tuples (s, I, o) consisting of a state s of the original model, an information set I
and an observation o. According to Theorem 15, history formulas can be viewed on this
model as state formulas, and a model checking procedure can be devised by merely following
the definition of the alternative semantics.
LetM = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι, oι). We define the Kripke structure Mˆ = (S′, T ′, V ′, sι′),
where:
S′ = S × 2S ×O,
(s, I, o) T ′ (s′, I ′, o) if s T s′ and I ′ = UT (I, s′, o),
V ′(s, I, o) = V (s), and
sι′ = (sι, [sι]oι , oι).
We call Mˆ the augmented model, and we write Mˆo the Kripke structure obtained by restricting
Mˆ to states of the form (s, I, o′) where o′ = o. Note that the different Mˆo are disjoint with
regards to T ′.
Model-checking procedure. We now define the function CheckCTL∗K∆ which evaluates
a history formula in a state of the augmented model Mˆ :
Function CheckCTL∗K∆ (Mˆ, (sc, Ic, oc),Φ) returns true if M, sc, Ic, oc |=I ϕ and false
otherwise, and is defined as follows: if Φ is a CTL∗ formula, we evaluate it using a classic
model-checking procedure for CTL∗. Otherwise, Φ contains a subformula of the form ϕ = Kϕ1
or ϕ = ∆o′ϕ1 where ϕ1 ∈ CTL∗. We evaluate ϕ1 in every state of Mˆ , and mark those that
satisfy ϕ1 with a fresh atomic proposition pϕ1 . Then, if ϕ = Kϕ1, we mark with a fresh
atomic proposition pϕ every state (s, I, o) of Mˆ such that for every s′ ∈ I, (s′, I, o) is
marked with pϕ1 . Else, ϕ = ∆o
′
ϕ1 and we mark with a fresh proposition pϕ every state
(s, I, o) such that (s, U∆(I, s, o′), o′) is marked with pϕ1 . Finally, we recursively call function
CheckCTL∗K∆ on the marked model and formula Φ′ obtained by replacing ϕ with pϕ in Φ.
To model check a formula ϕ in a model M , we first build Mˆ , and call function
CheckCTL∗K∆ (Mˆ, (sι, [sι]oι , oι), ϕ).
I Example 17. Let M be the model depicted in Fig. 2, where o1 is the blind observation
(∼o1= S × S), o2 is the perfect observation (s ∼o2 s′ iff s = s′), s1 is the initial state and
the agent is initially blind (the initial observation is o1). Note that we did not represent
indistinguishability relations o1 and o2. The augmented model Mˆ is depicted in Fig. 3,
where we only drew relevant states, i.e. those that are reachable from the initial state via
transitions and observation changes.
Consider formula ϕ = ∆o2(Kq ∨∆o1KAXq) which means that if the agent changes to the
perfect observation, then either the agent knows that q holds, or even after switching back
to the blind observation she knows that in every possible next step, q holds. After running
the algorithm, we get the following valuation for Mˆ :
V ′(s1, {s1, s2}, o1) = {q, pϕ}
V ′(s2, {s1, s2}, o1) = {pϕ}
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V ′(s1, {s1}, o1) = {q, p(Kq), p(Kq∨∆o1KAXq), pϕ}
V ′(s2, {s2}, o1) = {p(∆o1KAXq), p(Kq∨∆o1KAXq), pϕ}
V ′(s1, {s1}, o2) = {q, p(Kq), p(Kq∨∆o1KAXq), pϕ}
V ′(s2, {s2}, o2) = {p(∆o1KAXq), p(Kq∨∆o1KAXq), pϕ}
Let us explain why pϕ is eventually marked in the initial state (s1, {s1, s2}, o1) of Mˆ . First
look at state (s1, {s1}, o2). Since q is in V (s1), q is also in V ′(s1, {s1}, o2). Next, because
for all s′ in {s1}, q is in V ′(s′, {s1}, o2), the fresh atom p(Kq) is added in V ′(s1, {s1}, o2)
and thus the fresh atom p(Kq∨∆o1KAXq) is later also added in V ′(s1, {s1}, o2). Finally,
when ∆o2(Kq ∨ ∆o1KAXq) is evaluated on (s1, {s1, s2}, o1), since U∆({s1, s2}, s1, o2) =
{s1} and p(Kq∨∆o1KAXq) is in V ′(s1, {s1}, o2), the fresh atom pϕ is eventually added in
V ′(s1, {s1, s2}, o1).
The algorithm thus returns, as expected, that M |= ϕ.
s1
q
s2
¬q
Figure 2 Model M
s1, {s1, s2}, o1
q
s2, {s1, s2}, o1
¬q
s1, {s1}, o1
q
s2, {s2}, o1
¬q
s1, {s1}, o2
q
s2, {s2}, o2
¬q
Figure 3 The augmented model Mˆ
Algorithm correctness. The correctness of the algorithm follows from the following
properties:
For each formula Kϕ1 chosen by the algorithm,
pϕ ∈ V ′(s, I, o) iff M, s, I, o |=I Kϕ1
For each formula ∆o′ϕ1 chosen by the algorithm,
pϕ ∈ V ′(s, I, o) iff M, s, I, o |=I ∆o′ϕ1
Complexity analysis. In the following, we let |M | be the number of states in model M .
Model checking a CTL∗ formula ϕ on a model M with state-set S can be done in time
2O(|ϕ|)O(|S|) [11, 17]. Our procedure, for a CTL∗K∆ formula ϕ and a model M , calls the
CTL∗ model-checking procedure for at most |ϕ| formulas of size at most |ϕ|, on each state
of the augmented model Mˆ . The latter is of size 2O(|M |) × |O|, but each call to the CTL∗
model-checking procedure is performed on a disjoint component Mˆo of size 2O(|M |). Our
overall procedure thus runs in time |O| × 2O(|ϕ|+|M |).
5 Multi-agent setting
We now extend CTL∗K∆ to the multi-agent setting. We fix Ag = {a1, . . . , am} a finite set of
agents and define the logic CTL∗K∆m. This logic contains, for each agent a and observation
o, an operator ∆oa which reads as “agent a changes for observation o”. We consider that these
observation changes are public in the sense that all agents are aware of them. The reason
is that if agent a changes observation without agent b knowing it, agent b may entertain
false beliefs about what agent a knows. This would not be consistent with the S5 semantics
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of knowledge that we consider in this work, where false beliefs are ruled out by the Truth
axiom Kϕ→ ϕ.
5.1 Syntax and natural semantics
We first extend the syntax, with knowledge operators Ka and observation change operators
∆oa for each agent.
I Definition 18 (Syntax). The sets of history formulas ϕ and path formulas ψ are defined
by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Aψ | Kaϕ | ∆oaϕ
ψ ::= ϕ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | Xψ | ψUψ,
where p ∈ AP, a ∈ Ag and o ∈ O.
Formulas of CTL∗K∆m are all history formulas.
The models of CTL∗K∆m are as for the one-agent case, except that we assign one initial
observation to each agent. In the following we shall write o for a tuple {oa}a∈Ag, oa for oa,
and o[a ← o] for the tuple o where oa is replaced with o. Finally, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, oi
refers to oai .
I Definition 19 (Multiagent models). A multiagent Kripke structure with observations is
given by a structure M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι,oι), where
AP ⊂ AP is a finite subset of atomic propositions,
S is a set of states,
T ⊆ S × S is a left-total transition relation between states,
V : S → 2AP is a valuation function,
∼o⊆ S × S is an equivalence relation, for each o ∈ O,
sι ⊆ S is an initial state, and
oι is the initial observation for each agent.
We now adapt some definitions to the multi-agent setting.
Records tuples. We now need one observation record for each agent. We shall write r for
a tuple {ra}a∈Ag. Given a tuple r = {ra}a∈Ag and a ∈ Ag we write ra for ra, and for an
observation o and time n we let r · (o, n)a be the record tuple r where ra is replaced with
ra · (o, n). Finally, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ri refers to rai .
Observations at time n. We let ola(r, n) be the list of observations used by agent a at
time n:
ola(r, 0) = oιa · o1 · . . . · ok,
if ra[0] = (o1, 0) · . . . · (ok, 0), and
ola(r, n+ 1) = last(ola(r, n)) · o1 · . . . · ok,
if ra[n+ 1] = (o1, n+ 1) · . . . · (ok, n+ 1).
I Definition 20 (Dynamic synchronous perfect recall). Given a record tuple r, two histories
h and h′ are equivalent for agent a, written h ≈ra h′, if
|h| = |h′| and ∀i < |h|, ∀o ∈ ola(r, i), hi ∼o h′i.
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I Definition 21 (Natural semantics). Let M be a model, h a history in M and r a record
tuple. We only define the semantics for the following inductive cases, the remaining ones are
straightforwardly adapted from the one-agent case (Definition 7).
h, r |= Kaϕ if ∀h′ s.t. h′ ≈ra h, h′, r |= ϕ
h, r |= ∆oaϕ if h, r · (o, |h| − 1)a |= ϕ
A model M with initial state sι satisfies a CTL∗K∆m formula ϕ, written M |= ϕ, if sι,∅ |= ϕ,
where ∅ is the tuple where each agent has empty observation record.
5.2 Alternative semantics
As in the one-agent case, we define an alternative semantics that we prove equivalent to the
natural one and upon which we build our model-checking algorithm. The main difference here
is that we need richer structures than information sets to represent an epistemic situation of
a system with multiple agents. For instance, to evaluate formula KaKbKcp, we need to know
what agent a knows about agent b’s knowledge of agent c’s knowledge of the system’s state.
To do so we use the k-trees introduced in [24, 25] in the setting of static observations, and
which contain enough information to evaluate formulas of knowledge depth k.
k-trees. Fix a model M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι,oι). Intuitively, a k-tree over M is a
structure of the form 〈s, I1, . . . , Im〉, where s ∈ S is the current state of the system, and
for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Ii is a set of (k − 1)-trees that represents the state of knowledge
(of depth k − 1) of agent ai. Formally, for every history h and record tuple r we define by
induction on k the k-tree Ik(h, r) as follows:
I0(h, r) = 〈last(h), ∅, . . . , ∅〉
Ik+1(h, r) = 〈last(h), I1, . . . , Im〉,
where for each i, Ii = {Ik(h′, r) | h′ ≈rai h}.
For a k-tree Ik = 〈s, I1, . . . , Im〉, we call s the root of Ik, and write it r(Ik). We also
write Ik(a) for Ii, where a = ai, and we let T k be the set of k-trees for M .
Observe that for one agent (i.e. m = 1), a 1-tree is an information set together with the
current state.
Updating k-trees. We now generalise our update functions U∆ and UT (Definition 12) to
update k-trees. We first define, by induction on k, the function UkT that updates k-trees
when a transition is taken.
U0T (〈s, ∅, . . . , ∅〉, s′,o) = 〈s′, ∅, . . . , ∅〉
Uk+1T (〈s, I1, . . . , Im〉, s′,o) = 〈s′, I ′1, . . . , I ′m〉,
where for each i,
I ′i = {UkT (Ik, s′′,o) | Ik ∈ Ii, s′′ ∼oi s′ and r(Ik)Ts′′}.
UkT takes the current k-tree 〈s, I1, . . . , Im〉, the new state s′ and the current observation
o for each agent, and returns the new k-tree after the transition.
We now define the second update function Uk∆, which is used when an agent ai changes
observation for some o′.
U0∆(〈s, ∅, . . . , ∅〉, o, ai) = 〈s, ∅, . . . , ∅〉
Uk+1∆ (〈s, I1, . . . , Im〉, o, ai) = 〈s, I ′1, . . . , I ′m〉,
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where for each j 6= i,
I ′j = {Uk∆(Ik, o′, ai) | Ik ∈ Ij}, and
I ′i = {Uk∆(Ik, o′, ai) | Ik ∈ Ii and r(Ik) ∼o′ s}.
The intuition is that when agent ai changes observation for o′, in every place of the k-tree
that refers to agent ai’s knowledge, we remove possible states (and corresponding subtrees)
that are no longer equivalent to the current possible state for ai’s new observation o′.
We let O(h, r) be the tuple of last observations taken by each agent after history h,
according to r. For each a ∈ Ag, O(h, r)a = on if ola(r, |h| − 1) = o1 · . . . · on. The following
proposition establishes that functions UkT and Uk∆ correctly update k-trees.
I Proposition 22. For every history h · s, record tuple r that stops at h, observation tuple o
and integer k, it holds that
Ik(h · s, r) = UkT (Ik(h, r), s,o(h, r)), and
Ik(h, r · (o, |h| − 1)a) = Uk∆(Ik(h, r), o, a).
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
We now define the alternative semantics for CTL∗K∆m.
I Definition 23 (Alternative semantics). The semantics of a history formula ϕ of knowledge
depth k is defined inductively on a k-tree Ik and a tuple of current observations o (note that
the current state is the root of the k-tree).
Ik,o |=I p if p ∈ V (r(Ik))
Ik,o |=I ¬ϕ if Ik,o 6|=I ϕ
Ik,o |=I ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if Ik,o |=I ϕ1 and Ik,o |=I ϕ2
Ik,o |=I Aψ if ∀pi s.t. pi0 = r(Ik), pi, Ik,o |=I ψ
Ik,o |=I Kaϕ if ∀Ik−1 ∈ Ik(a), Ik−1,o |=I ϕ
Ik,o |=I ∆o′a ϕ if Uk∆(Ik, o′, a),o[a← o′] |=I ϕ
where o[a← o′] is o where oa is replaced with o′
pi, Ik,o |=I ϕ if Ik,o |=I ϕ
pi, Ik,o |=I ¬ψ if pi, Ik,o 6|=I ψ
pi, Ik,o |=I ψ1 ∧ ψ2 if pi, Ik,o |=I ψ1 and pi, Ik,o |=I ψ2
pi, Ik,o |=I Xψ if pi≥1, UkT (Ik, pi1,o),o |=I ψ
pi, Ik,o |=I ψ1Uψ2 if ∃n ≥ 0 such that pi≥n, UkT
n(Ik, pi,o),o |=I ψ2 and
∀m such that 0 ≤ m < n, pi≥m, UkT
m(Ik, pi,o),o |=I ψ1,
where UkT
n is the iteration of UkT , defined similarly to the mono-agent case.
The following theorem can be proved similarly to Theorem 15, using Proposition 22
instead of Proposition 13.
I Theorem 24. For every history formula ϕ of knowledge depth k, each model M , history h
and tuple of records r,
h, r |= ϕ iff Ik(h, r),o(h, r) |=I ϕ.
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6 Model checking CTL∗K∆m
Like in the mono-agent case, it is rather easy to devise from this alternative semantics a
model-checking algorithm for CTL∗K∆m, the main difference being that the states of the
augmented model are now k-trees. In this section we adapt the model-checking procedure
for CTL∗K∆ to the multi-agent setting, once again relying on the equivalence between the
natural and alternative semantics (Theorem 24), and we prove the following result.
I Theorem 25. The model-checking problem for CTL∗K∆m is in k-EXPTIME for formulas
of knowledge depth at most k.
Augmented model. Given a model M , we define an augmented model Mˆ in which the
states are pairs (Ik,o) consisting of a k-tree Ik and an observation for each agent, o.
LetM = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι,oι). We define the Kripke structure Mˆ = (S′, T ′, V ′, sι′),
where:
S′ = T k ×OAg,
(Ik,o) T ′ (Ik′,o) if s T s′ and Ik′ = UkT (Ik, s′,o), where s = r(Ik) and s′ = r(Ik
′),
V ′(Ik,o) = V (r(Ik)), and
sι′ = (Ik(sι,∅),oι).
We call Mˆ the augmented model, and we write Mˆo the Kripke structure obtained by restricting
Mˆ to states of the form (Ik,o′) where o′ = o. Note that the different Mˆo are disjoint with
regards to T ′.
Model-checking procedure. We now define the function CheckCTL∗K∆m which evalu-
ates a history formula in a state of the augmented model Mˆ :
Function CheckCTL∗K∆m (Mˆ, (Ikc ,oc),Φ) returns true if M, Ikc ,oc |=I ϕ and false
otherwise, and is defined as follows: if Φ is a CTL∗ formula, we evaluate it using a classic
model-checking procedure for CTL∗. Otherwise, Φ contains a subformula of the form ϕ = Kaϕ′
or ϕ = ∆o′a ϕ′ where ϕ′ ∈ CTL∗. We evaluate ϕ′ in every state of Mˆ , and mark those that
satisfy ϕ′ with a fresh atomic proposition pϕ′ . Then, if ϕ = Kaϕ′, we mark with a fresh
atomic proposition pϕ every state (Ik,o) of Mˆ such that for every Ik−1 ∈ Ik(a), (Ik−1,o)
is marked with pϕ′ . Else, ϕ = ∆o
′
a ϕ
′ and we mark with a fresh proposition pϕ every state
(Ik,o) such that (Uk∆(Ik, o′, a),o[a ← o′]) is marked with pϕ′ . Finally, we recursively call
function CheckCTL∗K∆m on the marked model and formula Φ′ obtained by replacing ϕ
with pϕ in Φ.
To model check a formula ϕ in a model M , we build Mˆ and call CheckCTL∗K∆m
(Mˆ, (Ik(sι,∅),oι), ϕ).
Algorithm correctness. The correctness of the algorithm follows from the following
properties:
For each formula Kaϕ chosen by the algorithm,
pϕ ∈ V ′(Ik,o) iff M, Ik,o |=I Kaϕ
For each formula ∆o′a ϕ chosen by the algorithm,
pϕ ∈ V ′(Ik,o) iff M, Ik,o |=I ∆o′a ϕ
Complexity analysis. The number of different k-trees for m agents and a model with l
states is no greater than Ck = exp(m× l, k)/m, where exp(a, b) is defined as exp(a, 0) = a
and exp(a, b+ 1) = a2exp(a,b) [25]. The size of the augmented model Mˆ is thus bounded by
exp(m× l, k)/m× |O||Ag|, and it can be computed in time exp(O(m× l), k)× |O||Ag|.
Model checking a CTL∗ formula ϕ on a model M with state-set S can be done in time
2O(|ϕ|) × O(|S|) [11, 17]. For a CTL∗K∆m formula ϕ of knowledge depth at most k and
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a model M with l states, our procedure calls the CTL∗ model-checking procedure for at
most |ϕ| formulas of size at most |ϕ|, on each state of the augmented model Mˆ which has
size exp(m × l, k)/m × |O|m. Each recursive call (for each subformula and state of Mˆ) is
performed on a disjoint component Mˆo of size at most exp(m × l, k)/m, and thus takes
time 2O(|ϕ|) × O(exp(m × l, k)/m), and there are at most |ϕ| × exp(m × l, k)/m × |O|m
of them. Our overall procedure thus runs in time |O|m × 2O(|ϕ|) × exp(O(m × l), k), i.e.
|O||Ag| × 2O(|ϕ|) × exp(O(|Ag| × |M |), k).
7 Expressivity
In this section we prove that the observation-change operator adds expressive power to
epistemic temporal logics. Formally, we compare the expressive power of CTL∗K∆m with
that of CTL∗Km [14, 9], which is the syntactic fragment of CTL∗K∆m obtained by removing
the observation-change operator. Our semantics for CTL∗K∆m generalises that of CTL∗Km,
with which it coincides on CTL∗Km formulas. Note that our multi-agent models (Definition 19)
are more general than usual models for CTL∗Km, as they may contain observation relations
that are not initially assigned to any agent, but such relations are mute in the evaluation of
CTL∗Km formulas.
For two logics L and L′ over the same class of models, we say that L′ is at least as
expressive as L, written L  L′, if for every formula ϕ ∈ L there exists a formula ϕ′ ∈ L′
such that ϕ ≡ ϕ′. L′ is strictly more expressive than L, written L ≺ L′, if L  L′ and L′ 6 L.
Finally, L and L′ are equiexpressive, written L ≡ L′, if L  L′ and L′  L.
I Proposition 26. For all m ≥ 1, CTL∗Km  CTL∗K∆m.
Proof. This simply follows from the fact that CTL∗K∆m extends CTL∗Km. 
We first point out that when there is only one observation, i.e., |O| = 1, the observation-
change operator has no effect, and thus CTL∗K∆m is no more expressive than CTL∗Km.
I Proposition 27. For |O| = 1, CTL∗Km ≡ CTL∗K∆m.
Proof. We show that for |O| = 1, CTL∗K∆m  CTL∗Km, which together with Proposition 26
provides the result. Observe that when |O| = 1, observation change has no effect, and in fact
observation records can be omitted in the natural semantics. For every CTL∗K∆m formula
ϕ, define the CTL∗Km formula ϕ′ by removing all observation-change operators ∆oa from ϕ.
It is easy to see that ϕ ≡ ϕ′. 
We now show that as soon as we have at least two observations, the observation-change
operator adds expressivity. We first consider the mono-agent case.
I Proposition 28. If |O| > 1 then CTL∗K∆ 6 CTL∗K.
Proof. Assume that O contains o1 and o2. Consider the modelM from Example 9 (Figure 1),
and define the model M ′ which is the same as M except that s4 and s5 are indistinguishable
for both o1 and o2, while in M they are only indistinguishable for o1 (see Figure 4). In both
models, agent a is initially assigned observation o1. We exhibit a formula of CTL∗K∆ that
can distinguish between M and M ′, and justify that no formula of CTL∗K can, which shows
that CTL∗K∆ 6 CTL∗K.
Consider formula ϕ = EF∆o2Kap. With a reasoning similar to that detailed in Example 9,
we can show that M |= ϕ. We now show that M ′ 6|= ϕ: The only history in which agent a
may get to know that p holds is the path s0s2s5, since in other histories p does not hold.
After observing this path with observation o1, agent a considers that both s4 and s5 are
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Figure 4 Model M ′ in the proof of Proposition 28
possible. She still does after switching to observation o2, as s4 and s5 are o2-indistinguishable.
As a result M ′ 6|= ϕ, and thus ϕ distinguishes M and M ′.
Now to see that no formula of CTL∗K can distinguish between these two models, it is
enough to see that in both models the only agent a is assigned observation o1, and thus on
these models no operator of CTL∗K can refer to observation o2, which is the only difference
between M and M ′. 
This proof for the mono-agent case relies on the fact that CTL∗K∆ can refer to observations
that are not initially assigned to any agent, and thus cannot be referred to within CTL∗K.
The same proof can be easily adapted to the multi-agent case, by considering the same
models M and M ′ and assigning the same initial observation o1 to all agents. We show
that in fact, when we have at least two agents, CTL∗K∆m is strictly more expressive than
CTL∗Km even when we only consider models in which all observations are initially assigned
to some agent.
I Proposition 29. If |O| > 1 and m ≥ 2, it holds that CTL∗K∆m 6 CTL∗Km even when
restricted to models where all observations are initially assigned.
Proof. Assume that O contains o1 and o2. We consider the case of two agents a and b
(m = 2); the proof can easily be generalised to more agents. Consider again the models M
and M ′ used in the proof of Proposition 28. This time, in both models, agent a is initially
assigned observation o1 and agent b observation o2. For the same reasons as before, formula
ϕ = EF∆o2Kap distinguishes between M and M ′.
Now to see that no formula of CTL∗Km can distinguish these two models, recall that
the only difference between M and M ′ concerns observation o2, and that agents a and b
are bound to observations o1 and o2 respectively. Since in CTL∗Km agents cannot change
observation, the modification of o2 between M and M ′ can only affect the knowledge of agent
b, by letting her consider in M ′ that history s0s1s4 is indistinguishable to history s0s2s5.
However this is not the case: indeed, s1 and s2 are not o2-indistinguishable, and because we
consider perfect recall, s0s1s4 and s0s2s5 are not o2-indistinguishable neither, even though
s4 and s5 are.
More formally, define the perfect-recall unfolding of a model M as the infinite tree
consisting of all possible histories starting in the initial state, in which two nodes h and
h′ are related for oi if |h| = |h′| and for all i < |h|, hi ∼oi h′i. By its semantics it is clear
that CTL∗Km is invariant under perfect-recall unfolding. Now it suffices to notice that the
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perfect-recall unfoldings of M and M ′ are the same, and thus cannot be distinguished by
any CTL∗Km formula. 
I Remark. Unlike CTL∗Km, CTL∗K∆m is not invariant under the perfect-recall unfoldings
considered in the proof of Proposition 29. The reason is that in these unfoldings, observation
relations on histories are defined for fixed observations, and therefore cannot account for
observation changes induced by operators ∆oa.
Putting together Propositions 26, 28 and 29, we obtain:
I Theorem 30. If |O| > 1 then CTL∗Km ≺ CTL∗K∆m.
8 Eliminating observation change
In this section we show how to reduce the model-checking problem for CTL∗K∆ to that of
CTL∗K. The approach can be easily generalised to the multi-agent case.
Fix an instance (M,Φ) of the model-checking problem for CTL∗K∆, where M is a (mono-
agent) model and Φ is a CTL∗K∆ formula. We build an equivalent instance (M ′,Φ′) of the
model-checking problem for CTL∗K; in particular, M ′ contains a single observation relation,
and Φ′ does not use the observation-change operator ∆o.
Assume that M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼o}o∈O, sι, oι). We first define the model M ′. For each
observation symbol o ∈ O we create a copy Mo of the original model M . Moving to copy
Mo will simulate switching to observation o. To make this possible, we need to introduce
transitions between each state so of a copy Mo to state so′ of copy Mo′ , for all o 6= o′.
Let M ′ = (AP ∪ {po | o ∈ O}, S′, T ′, V ′,∼′, sι′), where
for each o ∈ O, po is a fresh atomic proposition,
S′ =
⋃
o∈O{so | s ∈ S},
T ′ = {(so, s′o) | o ∈ O and (s, s′) ∈ T}
∪ {(so, so′) | s ∈ S, o, o′ ∈ O and o 6= o′}
V ′(so) = V (s) ∪ {po}, for all s ∈ S and o ∈ O,
∼′= ⋃o∈O{(so, s′o) | s ∼o s′}, and
sι′ = sιoι .
We now define formula Φ′. The transformation tro is parameterised with an observation
o ∈ O and is defined by induction on Φ as follows:
tro(∆o
′
ϕ) =
{
tro′(ϕ) if o = o′
AX(po′ → tro′(ϕ)) otherwise
tro(Aψ) = A(Gpo → tro(ψ))
All other cases simply distribute over operators. We finally let Φ′ = troι(Φ).
Using the alternative semantics it is rather easy to see that the following holds:
I Lemma 31. M |= Φ if, and only if, M ′ |= Φ′.
This establishes the correctness of the reduction, and because we know how to model-check
CTL∗K, provides a model-checking procedure for CTL∗K∆. However this algorithm does not
provide optimal complexity. Indeed, the model M ′ is of size |M | × |O|, and the best known
model-checking algorithm for CTL∗K runs in time exponential in the size of the model and
the size of the formula [8]. Going through this reduction thus yields a procedure that is
exponential in the number of observations. Our direct model-checking procedure, which
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generalises techniques used for the classic case of static observations, provides instead a
decision procedure which is only polynomial in the number of observations (Theorem 16).
The reduction described above can be easily generalised to the multi-agent case, by creating
one copyMo of the original modelM for each possible assignment o of observations to agents.
We thus get a model M ′ of size |M | × |O||Ag|, and since the best known model-checking
procedure for CTL∗Km is k-exponential in the size of the model [8], this reduction provides a
procedure which is k-exponential in the number of observations and k + 1-exponential in
the number of agents. The direct approach provides an algorithm that is only polynomial
in the number of observations, exponential in the number of agents, and whose combined
complexity is k-exponential time (Theorem 25).
9 Conclusion and future work
Epistemic temporal logics play a central role in MAS as they permit to describe in an elegant
way the knowledge of agents along the evolution of a system. Previous works in this field have
treated agents’ observation power as a static feature. However, in many real life scenarios,
agents’ observation power may change along computations.
In this work we introduced CTL∗K∆, a logic that can express such dynamic changes of
observation power, and we demonstrated how this can be used to express relevant properties
in practical scenarios. We studied the model checking of CTL∗K∆ over both mono- and
multi-agent systems and proved that in both cases, the ability to express observation changes
comes at no complexity cost, but strictly increases expressivity. We also showed how to reduce
the model-checking problem for our logic to that of CTL∗K, removing the observation-change
operator. This provides a model-checking procedure for CTL∗K∆, but given the complexity
of the best-known model-checking algorithm for CTL∗K, this procedure is not as efficient as
the direct algorithm we provide.
As future work, we plan to build upon the techniques developed here to investigate
epistemic extensions of strategic logics with imperfect information. Several such logics have
been defined and studied recently [2, 5, 6, 3, 4], and [6] in particular already presents the
feature of dynamic observation change via change of strategy. We believe that the present
work will help to establish new results on the model checking of such logics.
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A Proof of Theorem 15
Theorem 15 directly follows from the following lemma:
I Lemma 32. For every history formula ϕ, model M , history h and observation record r
that stops at h,
h, r |= ϕ iff last(h), I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ϕ
and for every path formula ψ, every path pi, point in time n ∈ N and observation record r
that stops at n,
pi, n, r |= ψ iff pi≥n, I(pi≤n, r), O(pi≤n, r) |=I ψ.
Proof. We prove the result by mutual induction on ϕ and ψ. Let M be a model, h a history
and r an observation record that stops at h.
ϕ = p: We have h, r |= p iff p ∈ V (last(h)) iff last(h), I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I p, by
applying the definitions.
ϕ = ¬ϕ′ and ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ϕ2: Simple application of the induction hypothesis.
ϕ = Aψ: We start with the left-to-right implication. Assume that h, r |= Aψ. We need
to prove that for all pi such that pi0 = last(h), pi, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ψ. If pi0 = last(h), we
have h 4 h · pi>0; since h, r |= Aψ we thus get that h · pi>0, |h| − 1, r |= ψ. By induction
hypothesis we have (h · pi>0)>|h|−1, I((h · pi>0)≤|h|−1, r), O((h · pi>0)≤|h|−1, r) |=I ψ, that is
to say pi, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ψ, as pi0 = last(h).
For the other direction, assume that last(h), I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I Aψ, i.e., for all pi such
that pi0 = last(h), it holds that pi, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ψ. Let pi be such that h 4 pi; we prove
that pi, |h| − 1, r |= ψ. Because h 4 pi, we have that (pi≥|h|−1)0 = last(h). By assumption, it
follows that pi≥|h|−1, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ψ, that is pi≥|h|−1, I(pi≤|h|−1, r), O(pi≤|h|−1, r) |=I ψ.
Then by induction hypothesis we finally get that pi, |h| − 1, r |= ψ.
ϕ = Kϕ′ : For the first direction, assume that h, r |= Kϕ′, i.e., for all h′ ≈r h, we
have h′, r |= ϕ. We prove that last(h), I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I Kϕ′, i.e., for all s′ ∈ I(h, r),
s′, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ϕ′. Let s′ ∈ I(h, r). By definition of the information set, there
exists h′ ≈r h such that h′ ≈r h and last(h′) = s′. By assumption, h′, r |= ϕ, and by
induction hypothesis, last(h′), I(h′, r), O(h′, r) |=I ϕ. Because h′ ≈r h, I(h, r) = I(h′, r) and
O(h, r) = O(h′, r). It follows that s′, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ϕ.
For the other direction, we assume that for all s′ ∈ I(h, r), s′, I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ϕ′, and
we prove that h, r |= Kϕ′, i.e., for all h′ ≈r h, h′, r |= ϕ′. Let h′ be such that h′ ≈r h. By
definition, last(h′) ∈ I(h, r). By assymption, last(h′), I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ϕ′. Because h′ ≈r h,
I(h, r) = I(h′, r) and O(h, r) = O(h′, r), and we get that last(h′), I(h′, r), O(h′, r) |=I ϕ′. By
induction hypothesis, h′, r |= ϕ′.
ϕ = ∆oϕ′: By definition, h, r |= ∆oϕ iff h, r.(o, |h|−1) |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis,
h, r.(o, |h| − 1) |= ϕ iff last(h), I(h, r.(o, |h| − 1)), O(h, r.(o, |h| − 1)) |=I ϕ. By Proposi-
tion 13, because r stops at |h| − 1, this is equivalent to last(h), U∆(I(h, r), o), o |=I ϕ, which
by definition is equivalent to last(h), I(h, r), O(h, r) |=I ∆oϕ.
Let pi be a path, n a natural number and r an observation record that stops at n.
ψ = ϕ: By definition, pi, n, r |= ϕ iff pi≤n, r |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis, the
latter is equivalent to last(pi≤n), I(pi≤n, r), O(pi≤n, r) |=I ϕ. Because (pi≥n)0 = last(pi≤n), by
definition this is also equivalent to pi≥n, I(pi≤n, r), O(pi≤n, r) |=I ϕ, which concludes.
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ψ = ¬ψ′ and ψ = ψ1 ∧ψ2: By application of the induction hypothesis.
ψ = Xψ′: By definition, pi, n, r |= Xψ′ iff pi, n+ 1, r |= ψ′. By induction hypothesis
we get
pi, n, r |= Xψ′ iff pi≥(n+1), I(pi≤(n+1), r), O(pi≤(n+1), r) |=I ψ′. (1)
Because r stops at n, we have that O(pi≤(n+1), r) = O(pi≤n, r). Using Proposition 13, we
also have that I(pi≤(n+1), r) = UT (I(pi≤n, r), pin+1, O(pi≤n, r)). (1) thus becomes
pi, n, r |= Xψ′ iff pi≥(n+1), UT (I(pi≤n, r), pin+1, O(pi≤n, r)), O(pi≤n, r) |=I ψ′. (2)
Because pi(n+1) = (pi≥n)1, by definition we finally get that
pi, n, r |= Xψ iff pi≥n, I(pi≤n, r), O(pi≤n, r) |=I Xψ′.
ψ = ψ1Uψ2: According to the definitions, it suffices to prove that for all path k ≥ 0 and
ψ ∈ {ψ1, ψ2}, pi, n+ k, r |= ψ iff pi≥(n+k), UkT (I(pi≤n, r), pi≥n, O(pi≤n, r)), O(pi≤n, r) |=I ψ.
This can be proven by induction on k, using for the inductive step a reasoning similar to
that for ψ = Xψ′. 
B Proof of Proposition 22
I Proposition 22. For every history h · s, record tuple r that stops at h, observation tuple o
and integer k, it holds that
Ik(h · s, r) = UkT (Ik(h, r), s,o(h, r)), and
Ik(h, r · (o, |h| − 1)a) = Uk∆(Ik(h, r), o, a).
Proof. The proof is by induction on k.
k = 0: the result is immediate from the definitions.
k+ 1: We start with the first part of the proposition.
By definition Ik+1(h · s, r) = 〈s, I1, . . . , Im〉, where for each i,
Ii = {Ik(h′ · s′, r) | h′ · s′ ≈rai h · s}.
On the other hand, letting Ik+1(h, r) = 〈last(h), I ′1, . . . , I ′m〉 and o = o(h, r), we have by
definition that Uk+1T (Ik+1(h, r), s,o) = 〈s, I ′′1 , . . . , I ′′m〉, where for each i,
I ′′i = {UkT (Ik, s′,o) | Ik ∈ I ′i, s′ ∼oi s and r(Ik)Ts′}.
It thus suffices to show that for each i, Ii = I ′′i . Observe that because r stops at h,
h′ · s′ ≈rai h · s iff h′ ≈rai h and s′ ∼oi s. We thus have that
Ii = {Ik(h′ · s′, r) | h′ ≈rai h, s′ ∼oi s and last(h′)Ts′}.
By induction hypothesis, this becomes
Ii = {UkT (Ik(h′, r), s′,o(h′, r)) | h′ ≈rai h, s′ ∼oi s and last(h′)Ts′}.
For each h′ ≈rai h, we have that o(h′, r) = o(h, r) = o.
It remains to observe that by definition, for each i, I ′i = {Ik(h′, r) | h′ ≈rai h}, and we
get that Ii = I ′′i , which concludes the first part of the proposition.
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We now prove the second part of the proposition, assuming that a = aj .
By definition Ik+1(h, r · (o, |h| − 1)aj ) = 〈last(h), I1, . . . , Im〉, where for each i,
Ii = {Ik(h′, r · (o, |h| − 1)aj ) | h′ ≈
r·(o,|h|−1)aj
ai h}.
On the other hand, letting Ik+1(h, r) = 〈last(h), I ′1, . . . , I ′m〉, we have by definition that
Uk+1∆ (Ik+1(h, r), o, aj) = 〈last(h), I ′′1 , . . . , I ′′m〉, where for each i 6= j,
I ′′i = {Uk∆(Ik, o, aj) | Ik ∈ I ′i}, and
I ′′j = {Uk∆(Ik, o, aj) | Ik ∈ I ′j and r(Ik) ∼o last(h)}.
We now show that for all i, Ii = I ′′i .
First, by induction hypothesis, for each i we have
Ii = {Uk∆(Ik(h′, r), o, aj) | h′ ≈
r·(o,|h|−1)aj
ai h}.
Also, by definition, for each i we have I ′i = {Ik(h′, r) | h′ ≈rai h}.
Next, for i 6= j we have that h′ ≈r·(o,|h|−1)ajai h iff h′ ≈rai h, and by definition of the perfect-
recall relation, for i = j, it holds that h′ ≈r·(o,|h|−1)ajai h iff h′ ≈rai h and last(h′) ∼o last(h).
It is then easy to see that for all i, Ii = I ′′i , which concludes. 
